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Introduction: Reforms and remembering
In the decade and a half since the dismantling of apartheid in the early 1990s, the
economic geography of sub-Saharan Africa has been radically reconfigured, with
SouthAfrica rapidly assuming the role of the continent’s leading economic power. The
percentage of South Africa’s overall exports sent to Africa tripled between 1991 and
2001, for example, producing substantial trade surpluses with several neighbouring
countries and an overall balance of trade with the region that was tilted 5:1 in South
Africa’s favour (Naidu and Lutchman 2004; Daniel, et al. 2005; Rumney and Pingo
2004). South Africa's dominance as a source of foreign direct investments (FDI) is
even more dramatic. Investments by SouthAfrican companies in the thirteen countries
that share its membership in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
averaged over $800m per year between 1994 and 2004 (UNCTAD 2005). SouthAfrica
ranked among the top three sources of inward FDI in ten of those countries, and
accounted for roughly a quarter of all FDI into the SADC region over this period
(UNCTAD 2005; Rumney and Pingo 2004).
Tanzania is one place where the growth of South Africa’s regional influence has
been especially evident. Well-endowed with exploitable natural resources, and having
recently implemented a sweeping set of economic reforms designed to reduce the role
of the state in production and facilitate foreign investment, Tanzania has experienced a
rapid increase in capital inflows from South Africa, as well as higher levels of trade
with Pretoria. More than 150 South African firms, including most of the major
corporations with holdings on the continent, have entered the country since 1994
(Bandawe 2006; HSRC 2004; Gibbon 1999).
While the influx of capital has been hailed by the Tanzanian government as a boon
to economic growth, others have expressed deep concerns about South Africa’s
‘economic invasion’ into Tanzanian territory (Rwambali, et al., 2000). Issa Shivji, an
internationally prominent Tanzanian scholar, legal expert, rights activist and social
critic, has likened the South African exansionism to a ‘second wave of primitive
accumulation’ (Shivji 2006: 169-177). Increasingly, the South African corporate
presence has emerged as an important wedge issue in a protracted and painful national
debate centred on Tanzania’s economic reform process.
Many Tanzanians, whose political consciousness was shaped under the socialist
government of the country’s first president, Julius Nyerere, have objected to the
privatization of nearly 400 parastatal concerns, including some of the country’s most
prized economic assets (see below). Others have bemoaned the dumping of cheap
goods on national markets, and the extraction of valuable natural resources on
concessionary terms by foreign nationals. In each of these areas, the insult added to the
injury has been South Africa’s leading role in the process. In the eyes of many
Tanzanians, the fact that South Africans have become so centrally involved in the
Tanzanian economy has effectively de-legitimized the reform process itself.
My purpose in this paper is to explore exactly how the national debate over
Tanzanian economic policy has been inflected by the heavy South African presence. I
underscore the degree to which the aggressive pursuit of investment opportunities by
South African firms threatens to re-animate old tensions and give rise to reconfigured
forms of resistance grounded in national pride, economic sovereignty and political
principle. I suggest that popular memory of the anti-apartheid struggle will play a key
role in shaping current and future economic linkages, as the ideology and sacrifices of
an earlier political generation resonate on the terrain of its successor.
The data presented here were gathered during a year of field research in Tanzania
from July 2005-June 2006, and a series of shorter (4-8 week) research trips to Tanzania
in 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2007. My research was primarily conducted in the cities of
Arusha and Dar es Salaam. Ethnographic methods included participant observation;
semi-structured interviews; focus group discussions; and oral histories. Research
subjects included Tanzanians, South Africans and other expatriates who are directly
involved in economic sectors affected by South African investments, as well as
individuals encountered in social settings such as schools, recreation centres, shopping
centres, hotels, bars and restaurants that are frequented by South Africans. I also
conducted content analysis of government documents, press reports and trade
publications.
For much of the twentieth century bilateral relations between South Africa and what is
now Tanzania were strained and uneven. In the early 1900s following the Anglo-Boer
War, several groups of Afrikaners trekked to German-held Tanganyika, where they
were granted up to a thousand hectares of land by the colonial government in the hopes
of spurring agricultural production (Du Toit 1998; Spear 1997). These land use
privileges were reaffirmed in the 1920s when the British assumed control of
Tanganyika after World War I, and it was only the prospect of black majority rule that
pushed thousands of Afrikaner families to leave East Africa on the eve of Kenyan and
Tanganyikan independence in the 1960s. The early Afrikaner presence in Tanzania
therefore exists within living memory, as does the resentment locals felt at the colonial
government’s decision to protect Afrikaner land rights over those of natives (Spear
1997).
After independence and the merger between Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form the
Republic of Tanzania, Tanzania became one of the staunchest opponents of the
apartheid regime, playing a major role in supporting national liberation movements in
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and Namibia (Khadiagala 2007;
Mwakikagile 2007; International Conference on Peace and Security in Southern
Africa 1986; Nyerere 1978; Hatch 1976; Shaw 1976; Mittleman 1976). Diplomatic
ties with apartheid SouthAfrica were cut and were not re-established until the arrival of
majority rule in Pretoria in 1994. In the extended struggle against apartheid waged by
neighbouring African states, former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, played a
leading role. His influence was especially evident in the formulation of anti-apartheid
policies and strategies by the fledgling Organization of African Unity (OAU). The
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OAU’s Liberation Committee was also headed by a Tanzanian, Brigadier Hashim
Mbita. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Tanzania provided invaluable support to the
South African liberation movements, hosting key high-level meetings and
conferences, and providing crucial international diplomatic and logistical support. It
also sheltered an African National Congress (ANC) training centre, the Solomon
Mahlangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO), on its national territory. This ‘showpiece
of the liberation struggle’, which was launched in Tanzania’s Morogoro District in
1978 and continued training exiled South Africans until Nelson Mandela called for
their return in 1992, was perhaps one of the more enduring symbols of the long-
standing bond between theANC and the Tanzanian people (Morrow, et al. 2004: 3).
These activities on the part of Nyerere’s government, and the active presence of
South African comrades in their midst, had a profound impact on Tanzanians’ sense of
national identity and became deeply ingrained in their political consciousness vis-à-
vis SouthAfrica.As one interviewee put it:
In an effort to create a civil defence mentality, for example, Tanzanians were
repeatedly exhorted by their government in the 1980s to remain alert to the possibility
of a SouthAfrican incursion into Tanzanian national territory. Speculation was rife that
the SouthAfrican Defence Force would invade Tanzania from across the Mozambican
border in the south, that SOMAFCO would be bombed from the air, or that key pieces
of Tanzania’s infrastructure such as the bridge that links the core business district of
Dar es Salaam to its northern suburbs would be blown up by SouthAfrican commando
units (Tanzanian journalist, interview with author, May 29, 2006; retired white farmer
born in colonial Tanganyika, interview with author Nov. 13, 2005; cf. Morrow, et al.
2004: 115-118):
Middle-aged Tanzanians vividly recall the days when they were secondary school
students, cadets in the national youth service corps or serving in the military; how they
marched to the cadence of chants that called for the violent death of any white South
When it comes to South Africans, Tanzanians will always react with emotions ranging
from the violent to the ambivalent. For us, South Africans are always Afrikaners. When
we think of South Africans, we do so inevitably against the apartheid backdrop. We
always think of this period and the impact this had on our way of thinking .... To be
serious, at least initially, the liberation struggle was a Tanzanian show .... And we paid
dearly in terms of both support from abroad, and in terms of the drain on the few
resources we had, to go out and bankroll the liberation struggle. But we never asked
ourselves the question: okay, we brought independence to Rhodesia, South Africa –
what did we get from it? We had a one track mind. We didn't think about how we might
recoup our losses. Back in those days there was the PAC, the ANC, Frelimo, and
Mandela, Sobukwe, Mondlane ... It was us against them, and the ‘them’ was Pretoria,
Lorenzo Marques and Salisbury. Those were the ‘them’, and they had to be pushed off
the seat of economic power. There was no possibility whatsoever for dialogue. The ethos
was clear. (Retired Tanzanian civil servant, interview with the author, Oct. 28, 2005)
There was always this cat and mouse game. We were a bit too far away to bomb, and the
international community would have objected if South Africa had come to bomb us in any
case. But it was fortunate for us that we were that far away because otherwise South Africa
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African found within Tanzanian borders. In this context, the epithet ‘kaburu’, which is
the Kiswahili term for , carried tremendous pejorative force.
To this day, Tanzanians describe the civil defence alerts, the camaraderie of national
service, etc., as being absolutely critical in shaping an enduring antipathy towards
white South Africans. A programme officer for a local NGO squeezed her head
between her hands as she explained that it was ‘impossible to erase these [anti-South
African] feelings from my brain’.Asupermarket employee in Dar es Salaam, claiming
that her government had taught her to hate South Africans, expressed her distaste at
having to serve them biltong at her workplace. A elderly retiree in Arusha
acknowledged that he refuses to buy Vodacom, the most widely used cell phone service
in Tanzania, and a middle aged community activist stated emphatically to a friend that
she would not dine at the Steers fast food restaurant chain, both effectively carrying on
the old economic boycott of South African goods and services (Schroeder, R., field
notes, 2005-2006).
While such powerful negative sentiments against South Africans remain strong
among the Tanzanian citizenry, the terms of the bilateral relationship between
Tanzania and South Africa have undergone a profound sea change. Now instead of
honing the knife’s edge of Tanzanian national identity on the rough politics of the
southern African liberation struggles, Tanzania’s government has actively sought to
rehabilitate South Africa’s image, and curry favour with the post-apartheid regime.
Through speeches and impromptu remarks reported in the press, government officials
have exhorted the Tanzanian body politic to set aside their historical animosities and
stop calling the SouthAfricans (Mahwi 2004). In an answer to critics charging
SouthAfrican companies with ‘colonizing’ Tanzania, former President Mkapa went so
far as to announce: ‘I wish we could have South African investment in this
country. The old apartheid South Africa was our enemy ... The new independent South
Africa is a friend and partner in development’ (Moses 2002, emphasis added).
If indeed relations between Tanzania and South Africa can be considered a
‘partnership’at all, it is one that is notably lop-sided. In little more than a decade, South
Africans acquired controlling interests in Tanzania’s largest banking chain, the
national airline, and the national brewery. They purchased or built hotels, mined gold
and gemstones, and set up hunting and photographic safari companies. They won a
contract to manage the national electric utility, and established the country’s largest
cellular telephone and television distribution networks. They acquired factories
producing sugar, plastics, cement, and fertilizer. They set up grocery and restaurant
chains, and established market connections resulting in the importation of everything
from furniture and ceramic tiles to clothing and fine wines (Anonymous Feb. 28, 2000;






I remember how in National Service, the discourse was all about: ‘Our friends in
Mozambique, and Rhodesia, and Angola need us’. was: ‘ !’ [lit.:
‘Slaughter the Boers!’] Cut off their necks, bloody hell! Until Mandela came out of jail ... all
of a sudden the rules of the game changed. This was not just a new chapter, but a whole new
book. (Retired Tanzanian civil servant, interview with the author, Oct. 28, 2005)
Kaburu Kaburu chinja
Old enemies, new partners?
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The motivations driving these initiatives were varied. Some of the most important
investors in the mining and tourism industries moved to Tanzania because of its rich
endowment of natural resources. Others were simply pursuing comprehensive
corporate expansion strategies. The CEO for SAB Miller, for example, which
currently brews beer in sixteen different African countries including Tanzania, was
recently quoted as saying: ‘If there were more of Africa, we would invest in it’
(Anonymous July 22, 2005: 1). Tanzania also presented opportunities for gleaning
windfall profits from initiatives aimed at promoting regional integration, for example
through the construction of an inland port facility linking the otherwise incompatible
southern and eastAfrican rail networks (Robertson 2005; cf. Swarns 2002).
Measures taken by the Tanzanian government to make the country more ‘investor
friendly’ have been similarly important. The Tanzanian Investment Centre, the main
state agency for promoting Tanzanian investment opportunities to outside investors,
stresses that at least fifteen major new legal reforms have been enacted since the late
1990s, all aimed at streamlining the investment process (TIC, 2005). These steps have
buoyed investor confidence, resulting in Tanzania being listed as a
investment target in a number of surveys of South African corporate heads
(Anonymous Feb. 28, 2000; cf. Njau 2001;Anonymous, Feb. 16, 2000).
The net impression left by recent events is that South Africans have taken over
everything of value in the Tanzanian economy. A store clerk in 2004, for example,
summed up his frustration at this prospect with the statement: ‘Some people are saying
that if our first president could come back to life today, he would die again to see what
has happened. You can’t just keep selling everything!’ A pastoralist community
activist echoed this bitter sentiment, commenting that: ‘We now live in the United
States of SouthAfrica’ (Schroeder, R., field notes, 2004).
The political sensitivity of South Africa’s presence is not lost on the Tanzanian
government, which has been at pains to downplay South African dominance. Thus,
both in 2001 and again in 2006, the Tanzanian Investment Centre released data
showing that the country’s leading foreign investor was not SouthAfrica, but rather the
United Kingdom (See Table 1). These data were misleading, however. In presenting
totals dating back to 1990, the statistics failed to reflect changing historical
trends, notably obscuring the peak of South African investments in the early 2000s.
Government statistics also failed to adequately capture a critical pattern of recent
investments involving the privatization of government parastatals. Through numerous
acquisitions, South African capital has assumed a central role in the imposition of
fiscal discipline on Tanzanian workers. Thousands of former public servants have lost
the government sinecure they once enjoyed in a wave of retrenchments launched by
private employers. Bitter battles over these job losses and inadequate pension
payments have resulted in a number of strikes, arson, and other forms of protest.
Controversies swirling around South African presence have extended well beyond
layoffs and delayed pension payments, however. A partial list of some of the more




1997 – ConsCorps Africa, one of the continent’s largest tourism companies with 40
properties in six different African countries, made a splashy debut in Tanzania by
purchasing several key sites on the northern safari circuit. It then proceeded to raze a
well-known hotel on the rim of the Ngorongoro Crater and replace it with an ultra-
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luxury facility which it marketed to the world under the dubious rubric of ‘Maasai meets
Versailles’ (http://www.ccafrica.com).
1997 – In order to clear the way for South African mining investors, hundreds of small
scale gemstone miners were forcibly removed from the core of a lucrative tanzanite
mining site in the mid-1990s. In the ensuing decade, SouthAfrican security personnel at
the mine were implicated in numerous shooting incidents. Dozens of small scale miners
were wounded, several of them fatally, when they were caught ‘trespassing’ on
company territory. The corporate miners went on to establish an exclusive tanzanite
brand which was used to discredit unbranded gems mined by small scale miners as
potentially illegal and unreliable (Kondo 2001a, 2001b).
1999 – South African cellular operator, Vodacom, was granted a license to operate in
Tanzania and quickly became the country’s leading network. This growth was matched
by an aggressive publicity campaign, which included securing the rights to re-paint a
number of prominent buildings in large urban centres. In Dar es Salaam, giant multi-
storey renditions of the bright blue-and-white Vodacom logo became a fixture of the
urban landscape, creating jarring sight lines along main thoroughfares. At least one
major government building, the Tanzanian Commission on Science and Technology,
was initially included in this effort, but has since been repainted.
2000 – Tanzanian Breweries, Ltd. (which was acquired by South African Breweries,
now SAB Miller, in 1993) caused an outcry when it erected a public fountain in the shape
of a giant beer bottle on a well-travelled site in Arusha, where a memorial statue to
former President Nyerere and his famous ‘Arusha Declaration’ of socialist principles
had been proposed (Anonymous June 17, 2000). The new installation outraged local
residents because it spewed water at the height of a severe drought.
2000 – ABSA Bank tendered a bid to purchase the National Bank of Commerce, the
country’s largest banking chain with 35 branches, which was listed for privatization.
ABSA’s initial purchase offer of US $18 million was, however, rescinded in the
eleventh hour after it was discovered that NBC had accrued huge debts. Tanzanian
observers were subsequently mystified when NBC ended up effectively ABSA
US $18 million to assume the bank’s unresolved debts and take over management of its
operations (Rwambali 2000).
2001 – Two groups of SouthAfrican researchers were expelled from Tanzania for testing
ersatz anti-AIDS medications on Tanzanian soldiers, allegedly without their consent or
knowledge. One of the compounds – virodene – was based on ‘a highly toxic industrial
solvent banned in South Africa for use on humans’ several years earlier; the other was a
coal-derivative (Economist Intelligence Unit 2001).
2002 – After failing in earlier attempts to establish partnerships with the local carrier,
South African Airways (SAA) acquired a 49 percent stake in Air Tanzania Corporation
(ATC). SAApromptly repainted theATC fleet, replacing the Tanzanian national symbol
of a giraffe with a stylized version of the SAA logo, itself based on the South African
national flag. It also stopped booking tickets using the ATC flight code which, critics
alleged, rendered ATC ‘non-existent’ as far as the International Air Transport
Association was concerned. By late 2006, amid rising losses and antagonism between
the Tanzanian government and SAA officials, the airlines’ privatization contract was
cancelled and control ofATC reverted to Tanzanian authorities (Kizigha 2006).
2002 – The energy management corporation, NetGroup Solutions, assumed control of
TANESCO, Tanzania’s national electric utility. Following a serious drought in 2005, the
country experienced massive power shortages throughout the country, and the
NetGroup contract was discontinued on the grounds of poor managerial performance
(Anonymous May 25, 2006).
paying
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2003 – The Group Five Construction company began work on a major contract to build a
new headquarters for the Bank of Tanzania. Five years later, the original budget of $80
million for the as-yet-unfinished project had ballooned to $340 million. The cost
overruns for the building’s ‘twin towers’, which dominate the Dar es Salaam skyline,
generated heated debate in parliament, where they were decried as being ‘at least four
times higher than similar buildings in some of the world’s most expensive cities like
London, NewYork and Tokyo’ (Anonymous, July 18, 2007).
2006 – The head of South Africa’s central bank, Tito Mboweni, created a considerable
stir in Tanzania when he announced that the 14-member SouthernAfrican Development
Community, which includes Tanzania, would gradually ‘converge’ around use of the
South African rand and Botswanan pula, and discontinue the use of existing national
currencies such as the Tanzanian shilling (Anonymous 2005).
Because the thing is, they are the people who have the capital. They are the people who
have the technical know-how. They are the people who came in at the time when we
were saying, ‘We give up! We want to sell. This government is no longer a good
businessman. Government will step aside ... You do the business. Pay us our taxes.
Create jobs. And that’s it.’ And the economy is doing well in that policy ... It doesn’t
matter is doing it. [Former President] Mkapa said: ‘I couldn’t care who skins the
cat; I want a skinned cat. It doesn’t matter if it is South African, or black, or white,
yellow, green; I don’t give a damn.’And I agree with him … SouthAfrica is not an issue.
The issue is: there is an investor who was willing to come. South Africa will go all the
way to Libya! Why? During their isolation they knew how to work and they worked very
This steady drum beat of controversy can be traced in part to the heightened
sensitivities the Tanzanian national press corps developed toward South Africa during
the years of the anti-apartheid struggle. The practical impact of the inflammatory acts
themselves has been to keep the issue of South Africa's expanded role in the national
economy highly visible, and make it the centre of national debate.
The debate over Tanzanian economic reforms has revealed deep cracks, or political
‘fault lines’ (Goodman 1999), within the Tanzanian body politic along lines of race,
class and generation. Different forms of South African presence – including
investment targets, trade effects and on-site management practices – have inflected the
debate in specific ways.
Many in the Tanzanian business community have wholeheartedly embraced the goals
of the government’s neoliberal reforms and are sympathetic to South African
investors. They see the arrival of South Africans as the inevitable outcome of
competition fostered in the context of the country’s post-socialist transition, and point
to the benefits of inflows of entrepreneurial capital, technology and business skills into
the moribund parastatal sector: ‘Privatization has been a very good process. It has
meant that tenders have been granted to the most qualified firms. As far as South
Africans are concerned, they grabbed the opportunities. We didn’t. So more power to
them’ (Gemstone dealer, interview with author, May 24, 2007).According to this view,
South African capital filled a void, and it did so, not just because South Africans had
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hard. So the issue is not South Africa. The issue is people and work. People who want to
work, be regulated as they work, be rewarded for working hard. That is the issue.
(Businesswoman in Dar es Salaam, interview with author, Mar. 24, 2006)
The National Bank of Commerce was .And it was the Bank of Commerce,
with monopoly. I’ve never seen in the world, read anything about, a bank that has full
monopoly, and made a loss! [The South Africans have] turned it around. I never could
borrow in those days. But [now] I borrow. Loans were being given on the basis of little
notes coming from politicians ... So if it’s a South African bank that is facilitating my
business ... do I care? I mean, would that matter to you? (Businesswoman in Dar es
Salaam, interview with author, Mar. 24, 2006)
The government’s rationale is that we have had these businesses, but we have failed to
manage them ourselves, so we need to sell them to foreign investors. But these were
[i.e. state-run] firms. And it is a public mess-up. Punishing the private sector in
Tanzania doesn’t make sense. They put the blame on Tanzanians in general. If they had
first handed these firms over to the Tanzanian private sector, and then seen the Tanzanian
private sector fail, it would have made sense to seek out a foreign buyer. But not
under these circumstances. Besides, [Tanzanian] Breweries has a monopoly, so they
don’t even have to compete. I say, let a Tanzanian run Breweries. Then invite SAB in and
let them invest on their own and build up their own plants and come and compete.
Otherwise it’s not [a] fair [comparison] because of the monopoly situation. (NGO
representative, interview with author, Nov. 25, 2005)
The implication here is that Tanzanians had a chance to run their own affairs, but failed.
And the blame for that failure was laid squarely at the doorstep of Tanzania’s socialist
government:
Such views have been bolstered by the fact that several parastatals acquired by South
African investors have performed well in recent years. Tanzanian Breweries, for
example, has seen its market share increase from roughly 20 percent when SAB Miller
first acquired controlling interests in the firm in 1993, to over 80 percent by 1997.
Similarly strong economic performances have been recorded at Kilombero Sugar and
Tanga Cement, among other businesses.
Sentiments in favour of foreign investment have not gone unchallenged, however.
A basic critique stems from the perceived loss of national assets built up through the
sacrifice of Tanzanian blood, sweat and tears: ‘What I don’t understand is when South
Africans come in and buy up something that is already in place, like one of our banks or
our utilities. When they take something that others made, what I don’t
understand ...’ (Schroeder, R., field notes, 2005). The deep sense of pride in the
accomplishments of the socialist government, which are represented in retrospect as
having come about in spite of active resistance by the western capitalist powers, is
especially notable among Tanzanians who experienced the independence struggle first
hand. And in this connection, the notion that South Africans have ‘saved’ businesses
run into the ground by poor local management has been difficult for some to accept.
Critics of the government’s open door investment policies point to the fact that prior
managers were hamstrung by state policies, patronage practices and corruption, and
thus not in any position to run their operations effectively:
They also note that firms entering the economy under the privatization program were
often in a position to strip existing parastatals of their assets and use the proceeds of
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They came over, and grabbed up all the plums where they were available. Take
Breweries. I mean you have to be a total fool if you can’t make a profit with a brewery.
But the Breweries were losing money before because they were being bled to death by
bureaucracy. If somebody’s son was being married, 100 crates of beer were hauled off,
and that had to be absorbed as a cost of doing business. The government set the price of
beer, so the managers’ hands were tied in that regard. And any time the government
couldn’t pay salaries, they simply grabbed cash from Breweries ... It was a cash cow for
the government. One of [Breweries’] chief assets was actually the land they sat on. And
the South Africans acquired all those real estate assets along with the physical plant. So
the first thing SAB did was liquidate all the houses, and generated a bunch of working
capital. So the cost of acquiring the brewery was actually minimal ... [Scornfully] And
then they go on and talk about as if that were the reason for all of their
success. (Retired Tanzanian civil servant, interview with the author, Oct. 28, 2005).
I look at an investment, and I prefer to see it as something that has a meaningful residue.
Whereas the South Africans, they just come and grab and run. They’re likely to be here
for awhile, but let them tread carefully. This unconditional support for investment is not
tenable. There has to be some regulation. Yes we need expertise, exposure, experience,
but what price do you pay for all of that? ... Are [the South Africans] adding value? If
they are seen to be making a contribution to the welfare of the country, I don’t think
anyone would be against their presence. But that is the question. (Retired Tanzanian civil
servant, interview with the author, Oct. 28, 2005)
How long have the South Africans been in the country? And what have they done for
Tanzanians? They earn 200 million dollars [from gemstone mining] and what have they
done with it? ... They repaired the road ; they built a dispensary ; they built a
school block . What is that when you have taken millions of dollars of profits out of
the country? (Gemstone dealer, interview with author, May 15, 2006)
[SouthAfrican] investment ... does not benefit Tanzanians; that everything should come




The idea that South African investments are not ‘true’ investments in the sense of
helping to produce viable socioeconomic change in Tanzania also surfaced in several
interviews:
Indeed, the perception that South African investments had not generated more
substantial and immediate returns to Tanzanians was accompanied by feelings of deep
bitterness.As a prominent gemstone trader put it:
The debate over South African imports into Tanzania is similarly split. On the one
hand, observers often expressed blind trust in the principles of a free market: ‘If
someone comes and shows you something that he wants to sell to you, you can decide if
you want to buy it. That’s fine. That’s a fair exchange’ (Schroeder, R., field notes,
2005). On the other, they voiced deep concern about the impact imported commodities
had on local producers. The SouthAfrican supermarket chain, Shoprite, which entered
Tanzania in 2000, loomed especially large in the popular imagination. Judging from
the expectations expressed by small scale farmers, petty commodity producers, and
traders, all roads to lucrative markets would seem to pass through Shoprite’s doors.
Indeed, the proprietors of Shoprite have been excoriated for sourcing locally grown
products from outside the country:
(b) Imports
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businesses. Even when a business woman wants to sell tomatoes, she can’t do so
because tomatoes have already been imported from South Africa. Through such
investment, they are trying to fool us. In the beginning we thought they had come to
Tanzania to cooperate with us in the selling of our goods so that they would benefit us.
Only to realize that they had come to establish shops and sell goods from their
country, not even wanting to look at domestic produce. That isn’t friendship at all. It is
like someone coming to practice segregation in your own country. When someone
comes to your own country and doesn’t even want to look at your goods, it’s like he’s
insulting you. And that’s not investment. It’s humiliation. (Development worker 1,
focus group conducted by the author, October 21, 2005)
I represent [a farmer’s cooperative], and our members, many of them are into
horticulture. And dairy. They could supply Shoprite if they were given the proper
training. So I’ve told Shoprite that they should do some training. All they need to do is
say, ‘Here are our standards’. And then train Tanzanian farmers to supply them. They
should set some goals. In one year, you source X percentage locally. In year two, you add
more goods to your list. In year three, you add more. And by year five, you are meeting
the goal of sourcing 50 percent of some articles locally. But they are continuing to get
their supplies from South Africa. I mean there is no reason in the world that they should
be getting eggs from South Africa. Or getting dairy from South Africa. I can understand
that maybe they need to get some of their horticulture from SouthAfrica, their tangerines
of a certain size, and their grapes ... But tomatoes and onions? Unh uh! (Schroeder, R.,
field notes, 2006)
To locals, it doesn’t matter if it is SouthAfrican or not. It doesn’t. I mean for them it is an
economic crisis, forfeiture of land rights, forfeiture of their cultural rights, and that’s it.
But at the same time, to the older generation who have been living longer than I, who’ve
been living in [the socialist period of] , etc., who’ve been involved in … anti-
apartheid things, to them it means a lot. A lot. … The South African connotation is just
own
ujamaa
A different sort of complaint emerged with respect to Vodacom, the South African cell
phone giant which dominates the Tanzanian market. In a focus group session with
development workers organized in 2005, participants explained that when the number
of Vodacom subscribers grew so quickly (in less than a decade, the firm had enrolled
over four million subscribers in Tanzania), consumers expected that costs to
subscribers would go down. Instead, they continued to rise. The group was especially
angry about a sweepstakes promotion Vodacom had organized, in which the prospect
of winning a new house was used to entice consumers to purchase more pre-paid phone
vouchers. Participants argued that the cost of the house being raffled off came from
money. Rather than waste money on a promotion, they felt Vodacom should just
return those costs back to subscribers in the form of cheaper rates. This is what the
investors would do ‘ they were genuine and they were for the people’ (Development
worker 2, focus group conducted by the author, October 21, 2005).
Invariably, the complaints surrounding the influx of SouthAfrican capital turned to the
question of race and nation. In an interview regarding violence directed at small scale
gemstone miners (see above), for example, I asked a mining activist why nationality
seemed so important in the case of SouthAfricans when it was not a significant issue in
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terrible. And every time [the South African corporate miners] do these acts…the dog
mauling, and the use of chains, the [locking of trespassers in] closed [shipping]
containers, [the older miners] just link these things to apartheid…The Minister [of
Energy and Minerals] called the stakeholders to a meeting in Arusha and said the
[corporate miners] should stop these apartheid acts, because it reminds Tanzanians of
what their [South African] brothers went through…And even if you should go to [the
area] at the moment and ask anybody about [the South Africans], the name they use is
. The fact is they will use , and is a name we used during the
apartheid regime. So we don’t regard it as the new South Africa; we regard it as the old
regime. (Small-scale mining rights activist, interview with the author, Nov. 25,
2005)
Many of them … have that old Pretoria attitude … are building up anger among some of
us who are wondering how things could go so far with so little to show for it. I find the
South African generally abrasive. They do some things well. They know their cows by
name. Khaki shorts and socks. All big men. They work hard. But I think they have
possibly imbibed too much of the apartheid thing, and they have a difficult time letting
go of it here in Tanzania. (Retired Tanzanian civil servant, interview with the author,
Oct. 28, 2005)
If you are bidding for a tender for some job with a South African firm, it’s like there’s a
secret handshake that they do – some sort of oath that they take that: ‘I will only do
business with SouthAfricans.’ Because it is impossible to win those bids.Your bid could
be thousands of dollars less than the South African bidder, but he’s still going to get the
contract. It’s only when there is absolutely no alternative that they will offer bids to other
bidders ... This is true of even the international firms – as long as there is a single South
African working there, they will always look for another South African when it comes
time to award contracts. The South Africans could be here for a hundred years – I mean,
this is an exaggeration, but still – they could be here for a hundred years and they would
not become Tanzanian. They would still be South African. They would
change. (Schroeder, R., field notes, 2005)
Both Tanzanians and South African investors should be careful because we are in a
situation where working styles in South Africa could be translated as harassment in
Tanzania….Most South African investors are white. When anything happens at a
working place, Tanzanian workers are reminded of (apartheid) South Africa. I think we
need to educate our people and investors should spare a little time to study Tanzanian




Part of the problem from the perspective of Tanzanian critics is the attitude South
Africans have brought with them to Tanzania:
Commentators also complained about the insularity of the South African business
community. A woman from a relatively wealthy Asian Tanzanian family with multiple
business interests voiced her frustration with South African business practices in
general. Her perception was that SouthAfricans close ranks amongst themselves when
it comes to sourcing materials for any kind of investment project:
There is a growing consensus that tensions and contradictions spawned in the wake of
the recent rounds of investment by South African firms are on the rise. Even the
Director of the Tanzanian Investment Centre, whose job it is to promote foreign
investment, went on record as saying:
Another well-informed observer laid stress on the possibility that continued
insensitivity to cultural norms and the sovereign rights of Tanzanians to manage their
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own economy could result in more organized forms of resistance being launched
against the SouthAfrican business community.
For many Tanzanians these days, it seems very much as though the only source of
foreign direct investment in the country is South Africa. This has been deeply
unsettling on a number of levels. The fact that the long-anticipated South African
invasion has come in economic rather than military form, is seen by many as deeply
ironic. And many find it difficult to reconcile the influx of South African capital,
imports and neo-settlers, with residual animosities towards all things ‘southern’ born
of the liberation struggles of the past forty years. The lines of political solidarity
between Tanzanians and the South African public, once so strong and clear, have
grown increasingly complicated.
In this context, it matters a great deal which face the ‘new South Africa’ presents
when it arrives as an investor: is it that of an historical comrade in arms, espousing the
goals of the progressive wing of the ANC; or that of white-dominated corporate
capital, which has survived the transition from apartheid, mostly intact? Or are both
representations possible? These questions remain in play and are directly linked to
broader Tanzanian debates around neoliberal reforms and the future direction of
development in the country.
Currently, South African actors are deeply implicated in government reform
policies, which have ushered in a new set of social and political-economic realities that
are themselves heavily contested within Tanzanian civil society. In this regard, the
moral economies of the past and the present have come together to reinforce one
another. This has led many Tanzanians to condemn outright both the moral bankruptcy
of the Tanzanian neoliberal regime and South African capital’s central role in the
implementation of Tanzania’s ongoing economic reforms. Once again, perhaps, South
Africa could emerge as a key foil in Tanzania's ongoing popular struggle for liberation.
We aren’t going to stand for this indefinitely. People are going to fight back. This
mentality of approach where you segregate yourself, you play your own games, set up
segregated schools … this will cost them. It won’t necessarily be me who will come after
them, but somebody will. If you make a situation where people feel desperate in their
own country, this is a recipe for a disaster. (NGO representative, interview with author,
Nov. 25, 2005)
1. I wish to acknowledge and express my thanks for valuable comments offered on earlier
drafts of this manuscript by Darlene Miller and Richard Saunders. The research leading to
this publication was generously supported by a Fulbright Hays Faculty Research Abroad
grant and the Rutgers University Research Council.
2. In the interest of protecting confidentiality, I have masked or changed some identifying
details and omitted the names of all research subjects, including those with whom I
conducted formal interviews and those encountered in the course of participant observation.
3. The airlines partnership and electric utility management contract were subsequently
dissolved.
4. These include the following: National Investment Act (1990); Loans and Advances (1991);
Banking and Financial Institutions Act (1992); Foreign Exchange (1992); Public
Tanzania – SouthAfrica: a new struggle for liberation?
Notes
SOUTH AFRICAN CAPITAL IN THE LAND OF UJAMAA 31
Corporation Act (1992); Public Corporation Act Amendment (1993); Capital Market and
Securities Act No 5 (1994) and amendment 1997; Tanzanian Investment Act (1997);
Financial Laws (1997); Privatization Trust (1997); Mining Act (1998); Land Act (1999);





UK 255 325 23 (1)
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(Source: Machumu 2001: 4; Sebastian 2006: 11)
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